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Abstract:
We consider innovation incentives in markets where final goods comprise two strictly complementary
components, one of which is monopolized. We focus on the case in which the complementary component is
competitively supplied, and in which innovation is important. We explore ways in which the monopoly may
have incentives to confiscate efficiency rents in the competitive sector, thus weakening or destroying
incentives for independent innovation. We discuss how these problems are affected if the monopolist
integrates into the competitive sector.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
In many high-technology markets, including the computer and communications
industries,  (a) a number of strongly complementary components are used together in a
system to provide consumer benefits, and (b) some or all components are subject to
significant technological progress as the result of suppliers’ investments in R&D.  In this
paper, we examine how integration across components affects competition, with
particular emphasis on R&D competition.
We study this problem in the following setting.  Components A and B are valuable
only when used together.  There is a single producer of A labeled firm M, which may or
may not also produce B.  There is also at least one independent supplier of component B,
which we label firm N.
A familiar intuition asserts that when M and N are the only producers of their
respective components, integration through a merger of M and N would efficiently
increase the incentives for each firm to innovate by internalizing what are otherwise
                                                
1  We thank Richard Gilbert, Paul Milgrom, John Sutton, Jean Tirole, and
participants in the Competition and Innovation in the Personal Computer Industry
conference for helpful comments and suggestions.  We thank the conference
sponsors for financial support.2
positive external effects on one another.
2  We show by example, however, that there are
cases in which this intuition fails; integration can inefficiently reduce the incentives to
innovate.  Our example depends on the innovation’s being valued differently by different
consumers.
More importantly, the intuition does not carry over to market structures in which
there are multiple suppliers of component B so that, if M enters the B market, it would be
competing with independent B firms.  Consideration of such markets is an important
extension because there are many markets exhibiting this structure.  For example,
Microsoft supplies operating systems, and Microsoft and independent software vendors
supply applications software that works with Microsoft’s OS.  Similarly, Intel supplies
microprocessors, and Intel and other firms make motherboards designed around these
microprocessors.  Lastly, SBC supplies “access” that lets telephone subscribers make
long-distance calls, and the non-access portions of those calls are supplied by a variety of
long-distance phone companies, which in the future may include SBC.
3
In these examples and many more, concern has been expressed about firm M’s
being a supplier of component B.
 4  Independent suppliers note that firm M may be able to
                                                
2  We ignore the difficult question of why a merger would affect internalization.
3  In this example, M’s supply of A and its integration or non-integration into B are
largely controlled by regulation, so that some important issues are rather different
from those explored below; the analysis of the unregulated case is important for
fully understanding regulated markets, however.
4  While we assume that M is a monopolist, our analysis applies more broadly.  For
example, retailers (dealers) may have to make specific investments in selling
certain brands of cars.  Independent service organizations may have to make
specific investments in parts, in customer lists, and in learning how to repair
certain brands of hardware. This can be true even if firm M faces competition in
the overall systems market.3
control the ability of independently supplied variants of component B to work with
component A.
5  Independent suppliers fear that this power to exclude might be abused,
especially if firm M is integrated into the supply of component B and attempts to limit the
competition it faces as a supplier of that component.  On the other side, many economists
note that M may internalize through its sales of component A at least some of the gains
from innovation in B that might otherwise be dissipated in double marginalization or
escape to consumers.  These commentators argue that firm M will therefore have
particularly efficient incentives to innovate in B and to encourage others to do so in order
to enhance the demand for component A.
In this paper, we formally examine firm M’s ex ante (i.e., prior to innovation) and
ex post (i.e., after innovation has taken place) incentives to treat independent suppliers of
component B.   In particular, we explore how those incentives change if firm M enters the
market for B.  It is correct that an integrated firm M often has incentives to welcome and
even encourage the competitive efforts of independent suppliers of component B because
these efforts enhance the demand for firm M’s component A; and in our model those
incentives dominate.  However, firm M also has an ex post incentive, and in some cases
even an ex ante incentive, to force the supplier of a superior B component to price lower
than it would otherwise choose.  Integration into development and production of B can
strengthen firm M’s ability to engage in such a “squeeze.”
6
                                                
5  This may be particularly likely in high-technology contexts, where the interface
that joins components A and B may be subject to intellectual property protection,
or may be changed frequently, or both.
6  We use the term “squeeze” without suggesting that the behavior is predatory or
exclusionary.  In our model, firm M does not at all wish to drive a superior B
producer from the market, but only to expropriate some of its ex post rents.4
Several strategies may enable M to force an independent producer of component
B to charge a lower price than it otherwise might.  In a price squeeze, an integrated firm
M prices its variant of B lower than would a stand-alone supplier of component B, not in
order to take sales from rivals but to push their prices lower.  In an investment squeeze, an
integrated firm M invests in improving its variant of component B, not with the goal of
becoming the best or of making sales, but with the goal of driving the winning
independent supplier of B to price its (still better) product lower than it otherwise would.
Lastly, in an exclusionary squeeze, firm M demands a low price for an independently
supplied component B as a quid pro quo for granting access.
In none of these potentially tempting strategies does firm M exclude rivals in
order to earn greater profits from the sale of its own variant of B.  (For instance, under an
exclusionary squeeze in our model, firm M would rather not actually carry out the threat.)
Although exclusion of rivals could indeed increase the profits of M’s operations in the B
market, any such profits come (in our simple model) at the expense of profits in the A
market.
7  In this sense, our model incorporates the “one monopoly rent theorem.”
Despite this, we find that integration by M can create efficiency problems.
We show that, while often efficiency-enhancing ex post, squeezes can also
inefficiently reduce independent firms’ incentives to invest in improving component B.
Moreover, firm M may undertake activities in support of a squeeze that themselves are
socially wasteful, such as excessive R&D.  We show that integration can make these
problems worse.  We also argue that, even if the overall ex ante effects of a squeeze are
negative for firm M, it may be difficult for firm M to commit not to engage in one ex5
post, and that difficulty is plausibly greater if firm M is integrated into the supply of
component B.
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section we lay out a simple model.
In Section III, we examine the effects of integration when there is just one provider of
component B, either an independent firm or firm M itself.  In Sections IV and V, we
address our core topic: innovation in markets in which there are multiple suppliers of
component B.  Section IV analyzes squeezing through product-market and investment
strategies. Section V then examines threats of exclusion as a means of squeezing
independent suppliers. We also examine how firm M might use its power to exclude to
implement certain private intellectual property policies.  The paper closes with a few
observations on the implications for competition and business policy.
II.  THE MODEL
We analyze the following three-stage game.
Entry Stage: In the first stage, firm M and independent suppliers decide whether
to enter the market for component B.  We discuss alternative orders of decision making
by firm M and the independent suppliers below.
R&D Stage: After the entry stage has been completed, and the firms’ entry
decisions are common knowledge, firms that are active in the market for B
simultaneously invest in improving their quality levels (or lowering their costs).  Let Ii
denote firm i’s investment level, measured in dollars. This investment gives rise to a
                                                                                                                                                
7  Indeed, in our model firm M chooses never to take any profits in the B market.6
distribution function for firm i’s product quality, qi.
8  We assume the quality
improvement enjoyed by one firm is independent of the R&D investments of other firms.
Hence, we are ruling out both patent races and the possibility of spillovers across R&D
programs while they are under way.  Below, we consider the possibilities of licensing and
ex post imitation.
At times, the analysis is simplified by assuming that there are only two possible
outcomes of an R&D project, success and failure, and that all firms have the same R&D
production function. We normalize failure as a quality of 0 and label success q0.  In this
case, the distribution function takes the following form:
     1- r(Ii) for all 0 £ q’ < q0
prob ( q £ q’) =  {
     1 for all q’ ‡ q0,
where the probability that firm i succeeds, r(Ii), is assumed to be an increasing function
of its investment.
Pricing Stage: At the start of this final stage, the R&D outcomes qi may or may
not be common knowledge; we consider both cases. We assume R&D investment levels
remain private information.  Given the information structure, suppliers of B
simultaneously and non-cooperatively set prices for their components.  Let pi denote the
price chosen by firm i.  These prices—and the quality levels if not previously observed—
are then commonly observed and firm M sets the price of component A. We assume for
simplicity that the marginal costs of production are zero for component A and c for all
                                                
8  As we discuss below, the model can also be interpreted as one of process, or cost-
reducing, innovation.7
variants of B.  Throughout most of the exposition, we will subsume c in the demand
curve and take c = 0 as a normalization.
Once all prices have been set, consumers decide whether to buy a system and, if
there are multiple suppliers of component B, which one to patronize. We assume that
components A and B must be used in fixed proportions (normalized as 1-to-1) to generate
benefits.  We also assume there is a unit mass of consumers, each of whom buys either 0
or 1 system.  A type-q consumer has a reservation price of  q + q for a system that
combines one unit of A with one unit of good B having quality q.
9  Let D(p) denote the
number of consumers for whom q ‡ p.  We assume there exits a finite price, pc, such that
D(p) = 0 for all p ‡ pc.
10  At times, we restrict attention to the case of inelastic demand:
     0 if p > p0
D(p) =   {
     1 if p £ p0
Before analyzing this model, we note a few limitations. First, this baseline model
assumes away two mechanisms through which firm M might engage in a price squeeze:
we do not allow M to act as a price leader by setting either the price of component A or
the price of its component B before the independent firms set their prices.  We return to
this issue in subsection IV.C below.
                                                
9  Given the assumption that all consumers value quality equally, an increase in
quality is equivalent to a decrease in cost.  In Section III, we briefly relax the
assumption that all consumers value quality equally.
10  In addition to being realistic, the assumption of a finite choke price rules out
certain mixed strategy equilibria that might otherwise exist in which a firm that
has the lowest quality (or highest cost) makes equilibrium sales at a price strictly
above cost.8
Second, we assume away two reasons why firm M might wish to exclude an
independently developed component B.  When components A and B can be used in
variable proportions to generate consumer benefits, firm M might be able to extract more
surplus from buyers by excluding other component suppliers in order to create greater
flexibility in its relative pricing of components A and B.
11  Clearly, this motive does not
apply when goods A and B are used in fixed proportions, as in our model.  We also
assume that additional entry into the production of component A is impossible.  If such
entry were possible, firm M might wish to exclude based on fears that independent
production of B could serve as a stepping stone into the A-market—so-called two-stage
entry.
III.  THE EFFECTS OF INTEGRATION WHEN THERE IS A SINGLE
SUPPLIER OF EACH COMPONENT
As a benchmark, we first assume there is room for only one component B supplier
in the entry stage.  Either firm M (if it integrates) or firm N (otherwise) supplies
component B.  We examine the hypothesis that innovation incentives, like pricing
incentives, are better when the control of strict complements is in a single hand.
First, suppose there is no integration.  Suppose that, as result of its investments in
the R&D stage, firm N has innovated and raised its product quality by Dq.  By the
following standard argument, the increase in q is equivalent to a cost reduction that
increases the profits of both suppliers and raises consumer surplus.
12  Given our
                                                
11  This issue is addressed in Katz (1989).  If consumers have imperfect foresight
about service or spare parts pricing, this can also potentially create a motive to
exclude suppliers of those complements.
12  A similar logic applies if firm M sets the price of A first.9
assumption that consumers value quality changes uniformly, the market demand for
systems can be expressed as D(h), where h is the hedonic price of systems and is equal to
the sum of the two component prices minus q.  Suppose firm N has set the price of B at p.
Firm M can be thought of as choosing h to max {h – (p–q) }D(h).  The resulting quantity
is x*(p–q), where x*(w) is the quantity that would be set by a monopolist with marginal
cost w facing demand curve D.  This in turn defines a “derived” demand curve for firm
N’s pricing decision.  Defining n = p – q, firm N chooses n to maximize {n + q}x*(n).  Its
choice of n is thus the profit-maximizing price for a monopolist with marginal cost –q
facing the demand curve x*(￿).
By the standard comparative statics of monopoly pricing, the -Dq fall in –q both
makes firm N better off and also leads to a fall in n.  The fall in n decreases firm M’s
effective marginal costs in its pricing problem.  Hence, by the same comparative statics
result, firm M’s profits rise and its choice of h falls.  The fall in h makes consumers better
off.  Thus, when firm N innovates, both firm M and consumers are made better off.
If the firms integrate, the incentive to make such an innovation is greater, because
the previously external positive effect on M’s profits is now internalized.
13  Moreover, the
remaining externality from innovation—the external effect on consumers—is also
positive.  Hence,  when innovation results in a uniform increase in systems reservation
prices, the effects of a merger of firms M and N are as follows: (a) the private incentives
for innovation increase; and (b) the increased innovation that results is socially desirable.
                                                
13  Formally, it is straightforward to establish that the equilibrium quantity for any
given q is lower when the firms are not integrated due to double marginalization.
Therefore, the value of a cost reduction (equivalently, a uniform increase in
quality) is greater when the firms have merged.10
These results are of course well known (at least informally) and at least in spirit very old
(usually attributed to Cournot).
Perhaps surprisingly, integration need not increase the incentives to invest in
socially valuable R&D for general patterns of quality improvements.  Consider the
following example in which we relax the assumption that all consumers equally value
increased quality. One third of the consumers have a reservation price equal to 2, while
two thirds have a reservation price of 1.  If firm N innovates, the reservation price of the
consumers with relatively high absolute willingness to pay rises to 2+Dq, where 0 < Dq <
1.  The demands of consumers with lower willingness to pay are not affected by the
innovation.  The cost of innovation is I0, where 0 < I0 < (2/3)Dq, and there are no
production costs.
It is straightforward to show that, absent integration (and absent any other similar
form of cooperation between the two suppliers), sequential double marginalization leads
to an equilibrium price at which only the high-value consumers buy.  In this case, it is
profitable for firm N to innovate, because I0 < (2/3)Dq.  With integration, the equilibrium
systems price is 1, with or without the innovation.  Hence, the marginal consumer does
not value increased quality, and there is no incentive to innovate.  This outcome is
inefficient since the gross consumption benefits would rise by more than the cost of the
innovation: the inframarginal consumers are still buying and they value the increased
quality.  A feature of this example is of course that inframarginal customers value quality
differently from marginal customers, as discussed by Spence (1975).  Our argument
above (and probably previous work by others) shows that absent this feature, the standard
belief that integration improves integration incentives must hold.11
Although this example qualifies one’s confidence in the standard belief for
general patterns of quality valuation, nevertheless we do not mean to take very vigorous
issue here with the standard presumption that integration between a single A-firm and a
single B-firm “normally” will improve incentives for innovation in each component.
Rather, in the remainder of our paper, we explore how things may be very different when
there are multiple B-firms, so that even this qualified intuition may be quite misleading.
In order to isolate the effects of having multiple suppliers of B, we maintain our initial
assumption that all consumers equally value quality improvements.
IV.  INVESTMENT SQUEEZES AND PRICE SQUEEZES
We now turn to settings in which multiple firms are active in the B market, at
least at the innovation stage.  To find subgame-perfect (or perfect Bayesian) equilibrium,
we solve the game by working backwards in time.
A.  Analysis of the Pricing Stage
Our analysis of the pricing stage applies to both: (a)  complete-information
situations, in which the R&D outcomes, qi, become common knowledge before any
prices are set, and (b) incomplete-information situations, in which R&D outcomes
become common knowledge after the prices of component B are set, but before the price
of component A is set.  Recall that R&D expenditures remain private information.
In order to determine their pricing strategies, suppliers of component B must form
beliefs about how firm M will price component A.  Working backwards, suppose B-firm i
has quality qi and sets price pi.  Define i’s quasi-surplus as si = qi – pi.  The demand for A
depends only on its price and on the maximum of the quasi-surpluses; as in the previous12
section, the system surplus offered to a given consumer, and firm M’s profits in A, are
both increasing functions of that maximum quasi-surplus.
Now consider equilibrium pricing strategies for the B-firms given their qualities
and their predictions of how component A will be priced.  Our interest is in how the
prices of the B components are affected by firm M’s integration.  Suppose that firm M is
integrated into B.
Lemma 1.  It is a weakly dominant strategy for an integrated firm M to price its
variant of B at cost.
Proof: Let Q(￿) denote the cumulative distribution function, as perceived by M in
equilibrium, for the highest quasi-surplus offered by independent suppliers of B.  (Of
course, in the complete-information case Q(.) is degenerate.)   Thus, if firm M offers
price p and quality q, its probability of making B sales is Q(q- p).
15  Let R*(s) denote the
maximal profits that can be earned from the sale of A given that consumers purchase
units of B yielding quasi-surplus s. Note that R* is an increasing function.  Firm M’s
expected profits from components A and B together are
p(p,q) = Q(q-p) {R*(q-p) + x*(q-p)[p-c]} + ￿q-p
¥ R*(s) dQ(s)  .
If it sells both components (i.e., if it sells B), firm M will earn total profits R*(q-c) for any
p less than or equal to the systems price associated with R*(q-c) when it has quality q and
unit cost c.  This is immediate if M prices its B component at c, and follows for other
prices because M will adjust the price of component A pari passu to offset any change in
                                                
14  Of course, it follows immediately that firm M has no incentive to hinder or
exclude when it is not integrated.
15  This assumes the tie-breaking rule that M wins sales if it offers the same surplus
as an independent.13
its price of component B.  Hence, firm M’s expected profits from components A and B, if
it charges such a price, can be expressed as:
p(p,q)   =   Q(q-p) R*(q-c)   +    ￿q-p
¥ R*(s) dQ(s)  .
It follows that
p(p,q) - p(c,q) = {Q(q-p) - Q(q-c)}R*(q-c) + ￿q-p
q-c R*(s) dQ(s)
=   ￿q-p
q-c { R*(s) - R*(q-c) }dQ(s)  .
Hence, sign{ p(p,q) - p(c,q) } =  -sign (p-c).  Therefore, firm M’s expected profits are
maximized by setting p = c.  QED
Now, consider the independent suppliers of B.  We say that firm i hopes to be best
at quality q if, according to its subjective beliefs about others’ quality levels, there is
strictly positive probability that qj < q for all j „ i.
 16  Of course, in the complete-
information case, firm i hopes to be best if and only if it actually has strictly the highest
quality level.
Lemma 2.  An independent supplier of component B: (i) never makes equilibrium
sales at a price less than cost,  and (ii) sets price strictly above cost for all quality
realizations at which it hopes to be best.
Proof: The first claim holds because making no sales dominates making sales
below cost.  To see why the second claim holds, it is useful to introduce additional
notation. Let Fi (￿) denote firm i’s subjective distribution function for maxj„i qj.
Independent firm i hopes to be best at quality q





                                                
16  These beliefs are derived from the R&D production functions of the rival
suppliers as well as firm i’s beliefs about its rivals’ investment levels.14
Let sk*(q) denote the equilibrium quasi-surplus offered by firm k when it has
quality q.  Firm rationality implies that sk*(q) £ q – c for all k and q.





b - c - e yields expected profits of eFi(q
a) > 0.  Of course, if firm i
prices at cost when qi = q




Intuitively, each independent prices strictly above cost so as to make profits
should it be lucky enough to have the highest quality.  It trades off this desire against the
fact that it sacrifices profits if it misses selling because of its markup.  M suffers no such
tradeoff: it can lower its price and makes up its sacrificed B-profits one-for-one in A.
Now consider the effects of firm M’s integrating on ex post efficiency (that is,
taking the set of achieved quality levels as given).  With complete information, the best
quality wins (integration or not), and with the added assumption of inelastic demand this
is the only ex post efficiency concern.  Departing from that simplest model, integration
may have two kinds of ex post efficiency effects: it may affect whether the best quality
wins, and it may affect prices.
First, consider the possibility that the best quality fails to win under incomplete
information.  Suppose that firm M does not integrate.  In the symmetric Bayesian
equilibrium among the independent firms, the highest-quality firm makes all the sales.
Now, suppose that M integrates.  Because it prices at cost while its rivals (still) price
above cost, M always sells B when it is efficient for it to do so, and sometimes when it is
inefficient.  This effect of integration lowers efficiency (conditional on the set of realized
                                                
17  There exist Nash equilibria in which firms that do not make sales set prices below
cost.  We rule these out as unreasonable.  They would not, for example, survive15
quality levels).  As we noted, there is no ex post efficiency effect under complete
information with inelastic demand; thus, integration weakly lowers ex post efficiency
with inelastic demand.
Second, consider the efficiency effects of the changed pricing (holding the
winning quality fixed). The change in pricing generates efficiency effects only with
elastic demand.  There is a direct effect because firm M prices its B variant at cost: if
consumers buy that variant, efficiency is greater than if it were priced higher (as it
typically would be if offered by an independent).
18  There may also be an indirect pricing
effect of integration, mediated through the change in the independents’ pricing strategies,
and we discuss that next.
In this game, an independent firm cannot literally respond to the price of
component B set by an integrated firm M: they are simultaneous choices.  It is also simple
to see that each independent’s pricing strategy under complete information is unaffected
by whether or not one of its rivals is M: the independent prices at cost unless it has the
uniquely best quality, in which case all its rivals will price at cost whoever they are.  But,
under incomplete information, the independent firms’ Bayesian pricing strategies may
well respond to the knowledge that firm M’s strategy is to price at cost.  That is, each
independent makes its price a different function of its quality if it knows that one of its
rivals is pricing at cost than it would in a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium.
                                                                                                                                                
the introduction of trembles.
18  Although there remains a monopoly stage in which firm M sets the price of A,
with elastic demand consumers still will be better off if the quasi-surplus offered
in good B is higher.16
It would seem natural for this response to take the form of lower prices (holding
quality fixed).  In this case, there is an improvement in efficiency due to integration when
demand is not perfectly inelastic.  Note that this effect also gives firm M a private
incentive to integrate, which might be seen as an indirect price squeeze.
Interestingly, in some cases independent suppliers will respond to firm M’s
pricing at cost by charging higher prices than they would do if competing against another
independent firm rather than an integrated supplier.
19  In these situations, the indirect
pricing effects are negative for both welfare and firm M’s profits.
The following proposition summarizes our analysis of ex post efficiency effects
of integration:
Proposition 1. Under complete information or a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium,
the highest quality among B-suppliers efficiently makes all of the sales when M does not
                                                
19  To see why, consider the following example of a success-failure model in which
there are two suppliers of B and demand is inelastic.  Recall that a firm’s R&D
succeeds with probability r and yields quality q0 for its component B.  With
probability 1-r the R&D fails and yields a quality of 0.  For simplicity, let c = 0.
If the two firms active in the market for B both are independents, each sets its
price equal to 0 (cost) if its R&D fails and mixes over the interval ((1-r)q0, q0) if
its project succeeds.  Letting G(￿) denote the distribution function for this mixed
strategy, straightforward calculation shows that on this interval
G(p) = 1 - (1–r)( q0–p)/(rp) .
Now suppose instead that firm M is one of the suppliers of component B.  Firm M
sets its price equal to zero no matter what the outcome of its R&D.  Taking this
fact into account, the independent firm competing against M sets p = 0 if its
project fails and p = q0 if it succeeds.  Thus, an independent firm’s response to
firm M’s pricing strategy is to shift its pricing strategy upward.
Of course, one can understand this in terms of elasticity of the expected firm-
specific demand curve.  Firm M’s more aggressive pricing lowers that demand
curve facing each independent, but (as we see here) need not make it more elastic.17
integrate.
 20  When it integrates, firm M always makes equilibrium sales of component B
if it has the highest quality and—under incomplete information—may make equilibrium
sales of B when it is not the highest quality variant.  With inelastic demand, ex post
efficiency (i.e., conditional on R&D outcomes) is lowered by integration.  With elastic
demand, the ex post efficiency effects of integration are ambiguous.
B.  Analysis of the R&D Stage
Now, consider the incentives to conduct R&D.  Begin by assuming that demand is
inelastic and firms have complete information about product quality in the pricing stage.
In this simplest form of our model, the supplier with the highest-quality B earns a per-unit
margin equal to the difference between its quality and the second-highest quality.
21  This
margin is also the social contribution of that highest-quality B-firm.  Similarly, other B-
firms earn no revenues, and their ex post social contributions are zero.  For each
independent B-firm, therefore, the incentive to improve its variant of B is efficient.  This
is of course a familiar result in the context of an isolated market.
If M is integrated into B, its total profits from the sale of A and B are equal to the
maximum of its own quality and the second-highest quality level among the
independents.  As a result, M’s profits increase if it improves its B-product to a level
between the two highest levels of the independent suppliers’ variants of B.  Firm M
benefits even though there is no increase in total surplus.  Consequently, an integrated
                                                
20  Although we have discussed its properties conditional on existing, we have not
proved that Bayesian equilibrium of this game exists.  Rather generally, it does
(see [We are still looking for an existence proof]).  Note that when Fi (￿) contains
atoms, the only pricing equilibria may entail mixing.
21  This is the standard Bertrand outcome.18
firm M has strictly excessive incentives to improve its B product as long as there is
positive probability that it will end up alone in second place overall.  The reason is that an
improvement in the second-best B causes the best B to price lower, thus transferring rents
from the best B to firm M’s operations in A.  Thus, by investing in R&D, firm M can
squeeze ex post quasi-rents from the B-winner.  Firm M does this by improving its variant
of component B even if that improvement has no efficiency benefits.
Summarizing this discussion,
Proposition 2. With complete information and inelastic demand: (i) conditional
on the R&D level of firm M and the number of independent suppliers, an independent
supplier undertakes the socially efficient amount of R&D whether or not M has
integrated; and (ii) if M integrates into B, it has excessive incentives to innovate
(conditional on the R&D levels of the independent firms).
Now return to our more general model of demand.  The welfare economics turn
out to be very complex in general, but we can say something for the success-failure
model.  We say that a firm “is first” if it has the only successful R&D project, and that it
“is second” if it and precisely one other firm succeed in their projects.
Proposition 3. Suppose the conditions of the success-failure model hold. Then,
conditional on the R&D levels of other suppliers, an independent supplier’s level of R&D
investment: (i) is less than is socially optimal when information is complete and demand
is elastic, and (ii) is socially optimal when demand is inelastic.  If it integrates, firm M:
(iii) invests more in R&D than do its independent rivals, and (iv) may have socially
insufficient or excessive incentives to innovate conditional on the R&D levels of other
suppliers.19
Proof:
(i)  An independent supplier invests too little in R&D because it ignores the social
value of being second (second place profits are zero, but there is a social benefit from the
reduction in the winner’s markup), and it earns no more than the social value when it is
first.
(ii)  The result is familiar for the case of complete information.  Under incomplete
information, consider the following strategy S for a firm: Price at cost if R&D is
unsuccessful, and at q0 + c if R&D is successful.  It is not an equilibrium for all firms to
adopt strategy S, because any one could profitably deviate by charging slightly less if
successful (this increases expected profits when more than one firm is successful).  It
turns out that equilibrium instead involves successful firms mixing over prices up to q0 +
c, with no atom at that point.  Because that price is in the closure of the support of the
equilibrium pricing strategy for successful firms, any given firm could get its equilibrium
payoff by playing strategy S.  Because there is no atom at q0 + c and the equilibrium
mixing involves prices no greater than that, a firm with successful R&D that played S
would make sales with probability zero if in fact another firm had succeeded.  It follows
that a successful firm’s expected payoff is equal to q0 times the probability that no other
firm also succeeded.  This is the same expected payoff to success as under complete
information, and coincides with the firm’s social contribution.  Of course, payoff to
failure is zero.  The result follows.
(iii)  Firm M invests more because it internalizes benefits from being first or
second, whereas independents internalize only (fewer of the) benefits from being first.20
(iv)  As we saw above, the case of inelastic demand shows strictly excessive
incentives.  The following is an example (recalling section III) in which firm M’s
incentives are too low. There is room only for one B firm: under integration, it is M.
Demand is elastic, so there is a positive externality on consumers from successful
innovation: thus the integrated M has insufficient incentives to innovate.  QED
C.  Analysis of the Entry Stage
We now consider the entry stage, again for the case of complete information and
inelastic demand.  First, firm M has weakly excessive incentives to integrate when the
total number of B suppliers is unaffected by M’s integration decision.
22  This follows
from the fact that the equilibrium in the absence of integration maximizes expected total
surplus conditional on the number of firms—thus integration never can lead to a welfare
improvement and (ignoring technical efficiencies of integration) can only make things
worse.  We show by example below that profitable integration can in fact lead to a strict
fall in total surplus, so that firm M’s integration incentives are strictly excessive.
Complicating the picture, we note that independent suppliers also have excessive
incentives to enter the market for component B (taking as given others’ entry choices).
23
The argument is as follows.  Let W(I1, I2, …, In+1) denote the resulting level of expected
total surplus when firm 1 through n+1 undertake R&D investments (I1, I2, …, In+1).  Let
(I1*, I2*,…, In*, 0) denote the vector of R&D levels that maximizes welfare subject to the
                                                
22  In this case, firm M’s decision to integrate into B could be thought of as an
acquisition of one of the fixed set of B suppliers.
23  This may seem confusing because of the result that each firm captures its social
contribution in equilibrium.  But that result takes all other firms’ R&D efforts (or
outcomes) as given, whereas our assumption here is that others’ R&D choices
respond to incremental entry by others.21
constraint that In+1 = 0.  As noted above, (I1*, I2*,…, In*, 0) can be supported as a Nash
equilibrium in the R&D stage given Bertrand product-market competition and inelastic
demand, and given that firm n+1 is “out.”  Now, suppose that firm n+1—an independent
supplier—chooses to enter the market for B in the entry stage.  Let (I1**, I2**,…, In+1**)
denote the equilibrium R&D levels: note that other firms react to the new entry.  Firm
n+1’s expected profits are W(I1**, I2**,…, In+1**) – W(I1**, I2**,…, In**, 0), its social
contribution taking as given all others’ actions.  But the true social contribution of its
entry (taking account of others’ reactions to that entry) is W(I1**, I2**,…, In+1**) –
W(I1*, I2*,…, In*, 0).  By definition, W(I1**, I2**,…, In**, 0) £ W(I1*, I2*,…, In*, 0).
Therefore, firm n+1 has weakly excessive incentives to enter.  These incentives will
(generically) be strictly excessive when entry induces rival suppliers to change their
equilibrium R&D levels.
Proposition 4.  With complete information and inelastic demand: (i) M has
weakly excessive incentives to integrate when the total number of B suppliers is
unaffected by M’s integration decision; (ii) moreover, profitable integration can strictly
reduce total surplus; and (iii) independent suppliers have excessive incentives to enter
the market for component B.
To illustrate our argument above, consider the following example of a success-
failure model.  With or without integration, there are two producers of  B—that is, either
there are two independents or there is M plus one independent.  The R&D cost function is
I(r) = r
2/(2k), where 0 < k < 1, and q0 = 1.
If both suppliers of B are independent, each will choose to invest r = k/(1+k) and
earn expected profit (net of R&D costs) of k/[2(1+k)
2].  If unintegrated, M earns expected22
profit of r
2 = [k/(1+k)]
2.  Expected welfare is equal to k/(1 + k), which is the maximum
possible given the technology and the number of innovators.
If M integrates with (or replaces) one of the B-firms, the integrated firm will set r
= k (higher than each B-firm chooses absent integration, because of the quality squeeze)
and will earn expected (integrated) profit of k/2.  The remaining independent B-firm will
set r = k(1-k), which is lower than absent integration (because the integrated firm sets a
higher r).  Expected welfare is k(1 – k)
2 + k
2/2.
It follows (from these and simple further calculations) that integration is privately
profitable, even if M has to pay full price for its partner (as opposed to threatening to cut
it off, or merely to integrate with the other B-firm instead), and yet inefficient.
Integration leads the integrated firm to do inefficiently more R&D (higher r), and this
causes a welfare loss and a transfer of profit (on average) from a successful independent
firm to the integrated firm, despite the (socially efficient) downward adjustment of the
independent’s R&D spending in response.
More generally, it is not clear in what circumstances firm M has excessive
integration incentives when independents’ entry decisions and R&D efforts (which M
broadly values) are affected by M’s integration decision.  There is, however, one case in
which M fully internalizes the effects of its integration decision. Suppose demand is
inelastic and there is free entry into B after M has committed either to integration or non-
integration.  Assuming away integer problems, the independent suppliers of B make zero
expected profits given M’s integration decision.  Given that consumers earn zero surplus
in equilibrium, firm M internalizes all efficiency effects of its integration decision and
thus has efficient incentives to integrate.23
Proposition 5.  Suppose demand is inelastic and there is free entry into B after M
has committed to integrating or not.  Assuming away integer problems, firm M has
efficient incentives to integrate under complete or incomplete information.
This is a strong form of the internalization claim.  It is important to note that even
in this special case the logic does not carry over to decisions, such as the level of R&D
investment, made by firm M after independent suppliers have made their entry decisions.
D.  Analysis of Alternative Pricing Subgames
In this part, we briefly examine what would happen under some alternative simple
pricing subgames (structures of the product-market stage).  In particular, we examine the
outcomes when: (1) firm M sets the price of component A before the independent firms
set their prices; and (2) the independent firms set their prices after firm M has set the
price of its component B but before it sets the price of component A.  The goal is not to
proliferate cases but to illuminate some arguably robust effects that are missing from our
main model.  To keep the illustrations relatively simple, we examine them in the simple
case of complete information and inelastic demand.
Firm M sets the price of A first.  In this case, M sets the price of A to be equal to
(just below) the highest of the B-qualities.  The highest-quality B then makes all the sales
of B and makes infinitesimal quasi-profits: M has extracted all the quasi-profits through
pricing A so high ex post.  Naturally, the prospect of this destroys independent innovation
in B.  In a sense, M is behaving like a short-sighted regulator.
Firm M’s integrating may then be the only way to have innovation.  If demand is
inelastic, firm M has efficient incentives to innovate given that it is the sole innovator.
However, it could nevertheless be socially and privately optimal to have multiple24
innovators.   Firm M itself might want to combine the advantages of integration with the
advantages of excellence through diversity, by keeping the independents flourishing
while it enters.  Under this ex post pricing game, it cannot do so. Firm M would like to
commit to a better policy, but it is not so clear how to commit to ignoring good news
about the supply of complement B in pricing component A.
Firm M prices its component B first.   Firm M will in due course price A at the
highest offered quasi-surplus, as in our main pricing game.  But now there is first a price
squeeze through the pricing of B.  Suppose that M’s B-affiliate does not create the
highest-quality B.  Now, because the pricing of others’ B products can react to the pricing
of M’s, M has an incentive to price its inferior product below cost so as to affect the
pricing of the superior product.  Specifically, suppose that the highest-quality B is of
quality q, and M’s is of quality qM < q.  Then if M sets the price of its B at infinitesimally
above cost minus (q – qM), the highest-quality B will have to respond by pricing its
product just above cost.  M’s inferior B-affiliate makes no sales in this price squeeze, but
transfers all of the superior B-firm’s quasi-rents to M’s complementary operations in A.
Again, this pricing game (whose outcome is ex post optimal for M) destroys all ex
ante incentives for independent innovation by B.  Note that, taking firm M’s R&D level
as given, independent suppliers of B conduct less than the socially optimal amount of
R&D.  This situation contrasts with the equilibrium in the main pricing game, where the
independent suppliers conduct the socially efficient amounts of R&D given M’s
(excessive) R&D level.
While this pricing game as described is particularly artificial, we think that its
implication is not.  Presumably in the (much more complex) pricing game played in25
reality, independent B-firms would react to the prices charged by M’s affiliate.
Qualitatively, then, the squeeze would work essentially as described.
Again, firm M itself may well have an incentive to try to avoid this problem, but it
may be quite difficult.  While the prospects for a commitment “not to price below cost”
may be somewhat brighter than the prospects for a commitment to ignore innovations in
B when pricing A, we are skeptical that it would be a manageable commitment.  It seems
quite possible that the most manageable kind of commitment would be to refrain from
integration.  That would preserve incentives for independent R&D (in some versions of
the model), but loses internalization benefits and possible technical efficiencies of
integration.
V.  COOPERATION AND EXCLUSION
Whether or not it is an integrated supplier of component B, firm M may be able to
take actions that improve or worsen an independent supplier’s ability to offer value to
consumers. Most dramatically, M might deny the independent supplier access to
component A, but there are many other, less dramatic (or blatant) ways.  For example,
firm M might adjust how promptly and openly it gives an independent supplier of
component B information about component A’s specifications and the design of the
interface between the two components. In other cases, firm M may affect an
independent’s costs or quality through firm M’s choice of design for component A and
the interface.  In this section, we examine both firm M’s incentives to threaten or engage
in exclusion and its incentives to help independent suppliers.26
A.  Cooperation and Integration
We first consider firm M’s incentives to cooperate with independent firms’
attempts to improve their product qualities.  Firm M’s incentives depend, in part, on what
forces drive the pricing of the winning variant of B.  When the leading innovation is non-
drastic, the leader offers the same quasi-surplus to consumers as does the second-best
variant when the latter is priced at cost.  When an innovation is drastic, the winning
supplier prices B as if it had no competition from other suppliers of B.
With complete information and inelastic demand, innovations always are non-
drastic.  Moreover, efficiency depends solely on the quality of the best variant.  Firm M’s
profits, however, can depend on the quality of the second-best variant.  Indeed, when it is
not integrated into the supply of B, firm M’s profit is equal to the second-highest B-
quality level.  And an integrated M’s profit is equal to the maximum of its own quality
and the second-best independent quality.  The dependence on the second-best indpendent
quality gives M incentives to cooperate with the general process of quality improvement
by B-firms.  The incentive is not exactly aligned with efficiency, however, because M is
concerned with the second-best variant of B, while welfare depends on the best variant.
This suggests two kinds of imperfections in M’s incentives to help independents
innovate.  First, M may take actions that help the second-best independent at the expense
of helping the best.
24  Second, firm M may be unwilling to take actions that would
improve the best of the independent variants.  As an extreme case, when firm M is
integrated and there is only one independent supplier of component B, firm M’s profit is
                                                
24  We consider one type of action—creating ex post spillovers—in the next part of
this section.27
equal to its quality level in B.  Hence, in this case, firm M has no incentive to help the
independent supplier.
25
Under complete information, the lack of incentive to help the sole independent
supplier holds for any R&D function and demand structure such that innovation is non-
drastic.  For sufficiently large differences in quality, the profit-maximizing price of the
independent B will be driven by the overall demand for systems when demand is elastic.
In other words, the innovation will be drastic.
26  In this case, a higher quality level by the
leading supplier of B can result in increased profits for firm M, creating incentives for
cooperation.
When information is incomplete, firm M can have incentives to help an
independent supplier even when firm M is integrated, there is only one independent firm,
and the innovation is non-drastic.  The reason is that independent firm N cannot observe
integrated firm M’s quality level and thus N must price based on its subjective beliefs
about M’s actions.  A higher quality of its variant generally will induce firm N to offer a
higher level of quasi-surplus to consumers.  This higher level of quasi-surplus will
increase firm M’s profits from the sale of component A.
Summarizing this discussion, we have:
Proposition 6.  Under complete information, an integrated firm M facing a single
independent supplier of component B has no incentive to cooperate with that supplier
                                                
25  Firm M also has no incentive to harm the supplier in this case.
26  Interpreting –q as a cost, the standard conditions for an innovation to be non-
drastic (and for the proposition to hold) can be applied when demand takes any of
the following forms: D(p) = a+ bp, D(p) = ae
bp, or D(p) = ap
b, where a and b are
constants.  For this class of demand functions, a monopolist facing demand D28
when innovations are non-drastic. With drastic innovations, multiple independent
component suppliers, or incomplete information, firm M has incentives to cooperate.
B.  Exclusion and Integration
We now return to the concern that firm M will use its control of the interface with
component A to exclude competitors in B.  In our model, there are three ways in which
threatening exclusion could be profitable for firm M.  First, firm M could demand side
payments, or access charges, in return for granting interoperability.  Second, firm M
could insist that a supplier of component B commit to charging a low price for its output,
which would increase the profits firm M would enjoy from the sale of component A (a
strategy we labeled an exclusionary squeeze in the introduction).  Third, if the threats and
commitments can be made prior to the conduct of R&D, firm M might use the threat of
exclusion (or the promise to exclude others) as a means of increasing an independent
supplier’s R&D investment.
The next Proposition (not formally proved) records our claim that in our model,
27
there is no reason to exclude independent suppliers if the above options are not available.
Proposition 7.  Suppose side payments are infeasible, firm M cannot condition
access to A on B’s price, and there is no possibility of binding access negotiations prior
                                                                                                                                                
would choose the same price as it would if it faced demand x*(p), where x* is
derived from D in the manner discussed in the text above.  See the Appendix.
27  Recall that our model rules out two other reasons firm M might work to drive
independent suppliers of B out of the market.  First, firm M faces no threat of two-
stage entry.  Second, because components A and B are perfect complements, there
is no gain from excluding suppliers of component B in order to raise the price of
component B paid by consumers.29
to B’s conducting its R&D.  Then there is no incentive for firm M to threaten or engage
in exclusion, whether or not it has integrated.
In closing, we note that actual and threatened exclusion are in principle available
to M as strategies whether or not it is integrated into B ex ante.  However, if it were
illegal for M to engage in exclusion, integration could arguably make it harder to verify
whether it had done so. If M is not integrated into B, verifying whether a threat to exclude
has been carried out might be relatively easy. The reason is that, in carrying out the
threat, M would have to find some other independent B partner who would not be cut off
(or else no B would be available).  By contrast, if M is integrated into B, then it could
(with colorable arguments about confidentiality, appropriability of innovations,
intellectual property rights, and so on) “close the interface” to all independent suppliers.
C.  Spillovers and Grantbacks
We now consider another use of firm M’s ability to exclude independent
suppliers.  Firm M may be able to use its control over access to component A to extract
commitments from independent suppliers of B to share their intellectual property with
one another or with firm M.  That is, firm M may be able to mandate licensing. We also
address how firm M may use its ability to exclude as a response to the presence of
significant ex post technological spillovers.
28  Ex post technological spillovers arise
when, if one firm is the most successful innovator, some of the result leaks to other firms
whether or not that firm grants a license to its intellectual property.  In other words, other
firms can imitate the innovator.30
First, suppose that firm M is not integrated.  It turns out that it generally has
incorrect incentives even ex ante:
Proposition 8.  Suppose the number of suppliers of component B is fixed.  With
complete information and inelastic demand, firm M can have socially excessive
incentives to generate ex post technological spillovers or mandate licensing.
Proof:  With complete information and inelastic demand, there is no social value
to spillovers—the zero-spillover equilibrium yields the second-best levels of R&D
investment, and improvements in the quality of the second-best variant of B have no
value.
Spillovers can have a private value for firm M, however.  When its variant of B is
not the best one, firm M benefits from the increased competition due to an improvement
in the second-best variant.  When its variant of B is the best, firm M is indifferent with
respect to the second-best quality.
Firm M balances the gain from improvements in the second-best variant against
possible reductions in the levels of R&D investments made by independent suppliers.
For some parameter values, the ex post private benefits of spillovers will exceed the
private losses from the reduction in R&D investment.  QED
The excessive incentive to impose spillovers emerges starkly when firm M is
integrated and faces only one rival.  Suppose there are two B-firms: an integrated M, and
one independent, N.  Suppose that firm M can force N to provide intellectual property to
firm M in return for access to component A (a “grantback”).  With complete information,
                                                                                                                                                
28  Ex ante spillovers would mean investment by one firm helps prospects of another,
even if the former firm fails to be the leader. The analysis of how firm M would31
firm M’s overall profit is always equal to its own quality level.  The independent firm’s
R&D is socially desirable but of no value to M absent spillovers.  Thus even if only a
small amount of independent R&D will be forthcoming with a grantback, M would rather
impose the grantback than encourage more independent innovation.
29
Sometimes, however, there can be spillovers even in the absent of mandatory
sharing or licensing.  For example, one supplier may be able to reverse engineer the
products of others.  If these baseline spillovers are high enough, they may destroy the
incentives to innovate: any firm that makes successful R&D investments may find its
product quickly imitated and the resulting product-market rivalry may be so intense that
recovery of the R&D outlays is impossible.  In this case, firm M may restore intellectual
property rights—and, thus, the incentives to innovate—by using its control of access to
component A to keep imitators out of the market for B.
In this setting, firm M can have incentives to commit to exclusion if there are such
high technological spillovers that incentives to innovate in component B are very low
relative to the gross consumption benefits that innovation would create.  In this case, firm
M may use its control of access as a backdoor means of restoring intellectual property
rights.  It could either innovate itself or appoint an exclusive innovator.
30  Notice that this
incentive can arise in either the complete or incomplete information pricing games.
                                                                                                                                                
respond to them could be different.
29  Even if the spillover must be symmetric, M doesn’t care, because if it wins the
R&D competition in B it can optimally price B at cost and take the extra profits in
A: it has no need to take its profit margin in B.
30  Ironically, with perfect spillovers there might not be a problem.  At most one firm
would enter anyway since multiple firms never can earn profits or cover any fixed
costs of entry.32
Proposition 9.  In the presence of high baseline technological spillovers, firm M
may use its control of access as a backdoor means of restoring intellectual property
rights.
Of course, firm M can restore incentives only if it can credibly commit to
blocking imitators from access.  It might appear that exclusive contracts could be used,
but notice that the contract would have to be signed prior to the R&D investment.  But
then the value of having multiple innovators is lost.
VI.  CONCLUSION: PUBLIC POLICY PROBLEM, OR MANAGEMENT
PROBLEM?
We have seen how there are complex—and often ex ante inefficient—effects of
some strategies that firm M may pursue, and how some of these strategies may be made
possible or easier if M integrates into the B market.  These lessons apply even in the
simplest case of inelastic demand and complete information, where the “one monopoly
rent” or internalization theorem seems at its strongest.  In this section we raise the
question whether, or to what extent, these findings suggest the existence of a public
policy problem, rather than just a management problem for M.
Much of our analysis concerned incentives to extract quasi-rents from
independent B-innovators.  The ex post incentive is of course clear, but following the
internalization argument just rehearsed, one might ask whether an intelligently rapacious
M would efficiently avoid such problems.  Our analysis demonstrates that firm M may
internalize ex ante a great deal of the effects.  But the analysis also showed that in some
cases M has even an ex ante incentive to squeeze independent firms.
An intriguing way to think of some of this is that firm M  plays a role like that of a
“public-interest” regulator: in many ways it has broadly efficient incentives (since it33
captures through A at least a part of what in a stand-alone B market would be consumer
benefits), but problems arise because it has a great deal of power and commitments are
difficult.  Amidst concern lest excessive antitrust zeal bring regulation-style problems to
the computer industry, we should not forget that an industry with a single gatekeeper
would also be in some sense a regulated industry.
VII.  APPENDIX
In this appendix we provide some results on the effects of double marginalization.
Let p*(w) denote the profit-maximizing price for a monopolist facing demand curve D
with unit cost w.  In other words, p*(w) = argmaxp D(p){p - w}.  We examine how the
price chosen by an “upstream” monopolist (such as a uniquely and drastically successful
B firm in our model), knowing that its price will in turn be marked up by the downstream
monopolist, compares to a unified single-monopolist choice.  In particular, if these prices
are the same, then we can say whether or not an efficiency difference is drastic without
conditioning on the vertical structure.
Lemma A1.  If there exist constants a and b such that p*(w) = a + bw, then
argmaxp  D[p*(p)]{p – c} = argmaxp D(p){p – c}.
Proof:  Let p0 = argmaxp D[p*(p)]{p – c}.  Then p0 satisfies the following first-
order condition:
D(a + bp0) + bD’(a + bp0){p0 - c} = 0.
By the definition of p*, the following first-order condition must also hold:
D(p*(p0)) + D’(p*(p0)){p*(p0) - p0} = 0,
or
D(a + bp0) + D’(a + bp0){a + (b-1)p0 } = 0.34
Substitution then yields,
-D’(a + bp0){a + (b-1)p0 } + bD’(a + bp0){p0 - c} = 0,
which is satisfied if and only if
{a + (b-1)p0 } + b{p0 - c} = 0.
This last equation implies that p0 = a + bc.  However, by hypothesis, a + bc =
argmaxp D(p){p - c}.  QED
In words, Lemma A1 states conditions under which double marginalization by
firm M has no effect on the price chosen by an independent supplier of B.
Lemma A2.   There exist constants a and b such that h*(p) = a + bp if and only
if there exists a constant g such that gD’
2 = DD”.
Proof:  p*(w) = argmaxp D(p){p - w} if and only if the following first-order
condition is satisfied:
D(p*(w)) + D’(p*(w)){p*(w) - w} = 0,
Total differentiation yields
{2D’(p*(w)) + D”(p*(w)){p*(w) - w}}dp* - D’(p*(w))dw = 0,
or,
dp*/dw = D’/{2D’ + D”(p* - w)  .
By the first-order condition for the optimality of p*, (p* - w) = -D/D’.  Using this fact,
one obtains
dp*/dw = D’/{2D’ - D”D/D’} .
Hence, dp*/dw ” b if and only if D’
2 =  b{ 2D’
2 - D”D}.   QED35
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